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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT J. CASTAGNO and 
BERNICE B. CASTAGNO, his 
wife, 
Plaint iff-Respondents, 
•vs-
MELVIN CHURCH and 
ESTHER C. CHURCH, 
his wife, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
Case No. 14412 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Defendants and Appellants, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) (1), 
petition the Court for rehearing in the above-entitled case for the follow-
ing reasons. 
1. The Court failed to consider Defendant-Appellants' 
claim that the Trial Coiift erroneously denied Appellants' attempt to 
introduce evidence to clarify the ambiguity of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract regarding the two second feet of water referred to in such contract. 
2. The Court did not consider the Trial Court 's e r r o r in 
refusing to permit the,Defendants to show that the Defendants had in fact 
performed as far as possible their agreement to provide the two (2) 
second feet of water as contemplated by the parties. 
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3. In permitting the Trial Court to invoke prohibition 
against the Parole Evidence Rule, the Court prevented the Defendants from 
testifying to or submitting evidence of the Defendants1 theory of damages 
which would have been the alleged loss of one second foot of water at the 
proposed point of diversion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendants Church were the owners of certain lands 
located in Tooele County, and Mr. Church is a well driller by profession. 
The Plaintiffs are residents of Tooele County and desired to purchase the 
real estate owned by the Defendants Church with the understanding that a 
well would be drilled on the property by the Defendants for irrigation pur-
poses which would deliver two (2) second feet of water. For the Defendants 
to deliver the agreed two (2) second feet of water from a well and pump on 
the land in question, the parties had to either obtain the rights to develop 
water from previously approved applications or obtain previously appro-
priated water, since the Tooele area had been closed to further appropria-
tions by the Utah State Engineer's Office. Consequently, in anticipation of 
the agreement to purchase and sell Defendants1 land, the parties attempted 
to obtain certain water rights from a third party with an application for change 
in diversion point to the Defendants1 land being sold. However, that attempt 
was frustrated by the fact thai the water right in question was in another 
district which was not transferable to the district in which the Defendants1 
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land was located. Subsequently, the Defendants Church learned through 
the State Engiheer's Office that the Plaintiffs' mother had an approved 
application Which had not yet been perfected, and the parties therefore 
jointly arranged to obtain the approved application from Plaintiffs1 mother. 
The parties agreed that the Defendants would retain three-fifths (3/5) 
interest to the approved application which was for five (5) second feet of 
water and that two-fifths (2/5) interest, the equivalent of two (2) second feet 
of water, would be assigned to the property being sold by the Defendants to 
the Plaintiffs with the understanding that the Defendants would drill and 
complete the well and install a pump. The pairties agreed that they would 
then jointly apply for a change in diversion point on the approved application 
from the Plaintiffs' mothers property to the Defendants' property and per-
fect the two (2) second feet of water pursuant to the agreement. 
To understand Defendants' claifri that the parole agreements 
were an integral part of the contract sued upon, and to also show that the 
Defendants performed their part of the contract as far as permitted by the 
Plaintiffs, the following events are shown chronologically: 
1. Earnest money receipt for purchase of agreement, 
h, dated March 10, 1973. 
2. Assignment of water right from Plaintiffs' mother 
to Plaintiffs, August 20, 1973. 
3. Assignment of three-fifths (3/5) interest to approved 
application number 32822, September 7, 1973. 
4. Uniform Real Estate Contract dated December 14, 1973, 
executed December 18, 1973. 
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5. Application for segregation of water right dated 
February 26, 1974. 
6. Application for change in diversion point for water 
rights dated February 26, 1974. 
7. First hearing for Defendants1 change of applications 
with State Engineer, September 17, 1974, cancelled 
at Plaintiffs1 request, September 17, 1974. 
8. Tender of payment of Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
March 13, 1975. 
9. Complaint filed by Plaintiffs on or about May 15, 1975. 
10. Trial, October, 1975. 
After the parties had acquired the approved application 
from Plaintiffs' mother and the three-fifths (3/5) interest to said application 
conveyed by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants, and the other two-fifths (2/5) 
interest was retained by the Defendants for the property being sold, the 
Plaintiffs refused to proceed with the application for change in diversion 
point, and claimed that the Defendants had failed to deliver the one (1) 
second foot of water as agreed in the earnest money receipt. 
Based upon Defendants' application to segregate a water 
interest and to obtain a change in diversion point, a hearing was scheduled 
by the State Engineer's Office. At the insistence of Plaintiffs' attorney, 
Mr. Edward Watson, the hearing was cancelled a few hours prior to the 
time of the hearing and no further hearing was held on the matter, through 
and including the trial date of this case. After the hearing was cancelled 
at Plaintiffs' attorney's request, certain Affidavits of Protest were filed 
by several of the Castagno families who arc all cousins of the Plaintiffs 
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in this action. The Affidavits of Protest stated, among other things, HVH 
Defendants did hot have good title to the approved application conveyed to 
them by the Plaintiff Castagnos. 
At the time of trial , one of the issues to be determined was 
whether the Defendants Church had breached their agreement in failing to 
convey to the Plaintiffs Castagnos one (!) second foot of water as contemplated 
by the Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Plaintiffs contended that the 
Defendants had breached their agreement by failing to deliver the rights to 
one (1) second foot of water and therefore the Plaintiffs suffered damages, 
being the difference between the land without irrigation and the land under 
irrigation. The Defendants attempted to show, in clarification of the 
wording of the Uniform Real Estate Contract which was dated December 
14> 1973, they had already performed on their agreement as to the one (1) 
second foot of water since the Plaintiffs had retained the rights to perfect 
two (2) second feet of water from the approved permit purchased from the 
Plaintiffs1 mother, as intended by the parties, and that one-fifth (1/5) interest 
was Defendants' contribution to fulfill the provisions of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. The Defendants further attempted to show that the only 
reason the approved application had not been perfected to meet the provisions 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract is because the Plaintiffs refused to pro-
ceed as verbally agreed between the parties to file their application for change 
in diveirsion pbint and to file a segregated application. Further, that Plaintiffs 
had their attorney caticel the hearing on the applications which had been 
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scheduled prior to the t r ia l of this case. Furthermore, the subsequent 
attempt by the Defendants to perfect the water right in question was 
impeded by the protests filed by Plaintiffs' cousins. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
POINT I 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT 
APPELLANTS1 CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY DENIED APPELLANTS1 ATTEMPT 
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE TO CLARIFY THE 
AMBIGUITY OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT REGARDING THE TWO SECOND FEET 
OF WATER REFERRED TO IN SUCH CONTRACT. 
As outlined in the Statement of Facts, the parties contem-
plated obtaining two (2) second feet of water not through a new application 
for appropriation, since both parties knew that the Tooele area had been 
closed to new appropriations. The parties did contemplate that a water 
right would either be transferred by an application for change in diversion 
point, or a previously approved application would be perfected with a change 
in diversion point and beneficial use of the water. Consequently, the parties 
intentionally and with full knowledge left the well certificate number blank 
on the Uniform Real Estate Contract since the well certificate number or the 
number for the certificate of appropriation could not be written into the con-
tract until the change of diversion point had been approved, the water appropriated 
for beneficial use, and a certificate of appropriation approved by the State 
Engineers Office. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants were fully apprised that 
the provisions relating to two (2) second feet of water, one of which was to be 
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Plaintiffs, were water rights which the parties jointly intended to perfect 
in the future. 
The Trial Court, however, consistently held that none of this 
evidence was adniissable because it violated the rule against parole evidence. 
Defendants cbnsistently maintained that such evidence was being offered for 
the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
relating to the two (2) second feet of water and the certificate number which 
was left blank; The Uniform Real Estate Contract was prepared by Plaintiffs' 
attorney. ;^ 
M The rule on parole evidence in the State of Utah is well 
defined. In Jones vs. ACME Building Products, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 
450 P2d 743, the Trial Court was confronted with the definition of the term 
"net worth". The Trial Court ruled that there was no ambiguity as to the 
term net worth, but the Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's decision 
and held that the term net worth was sufficiently ambigious that parole 
evidence should have been permitted by the Trial Court. 
In the instant case, the ambiguity is more obvious than the 
term net worth in that the parties referred to a "certificate number ", 
which would have very little meaning without the parole testimony to explain 
why the parties executed the contract without the certificate number. Further-
more, the contract was ambiguous in not clearly defining how the Plaintiffs and 
the Defendants were to each deliver the rights to one (1) share of water 
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to the property sold by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, when the entire 
Tooele area was closed to new appropriations. 
Had the Trial Court permitted the parole testimony, there 
is little question that the case would have resulted in a decision favoring 
the Defendants rather than the Plaintiffs. The Statement of Facts clearly 
outlines the evidence the Defendants intended to submit to the Trial Court 
which was refused as being in violation of the Parole Evidence Rule. 
I\)1NT 11 
THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ERROR IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
DEFENDANTS TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
HAD IN FACT PERFORMED AS FAR AS POSSIBLE 
THEIR AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE THE TWO 
SECOND FEET OF WATER AS CONTEMPLATED 
BY THE PARTIES. 
The earnest money receipt which outlined some of the pro-
visions of the intended agreement was dated March 10, 1973. The Uniform 
Real Estate Contract was dnted December 14, 1973, and executed on the 18th 
of December, 1973. During the interim between the earnest money receipt 
and the Uniform Real Estate Contract, the parties, in an effort to meet their 
respective obligations of providing one (1) second foot of water each to the 
property being purchased by the Plaintiffs from the Defendants, attempted to 
obtain water from a district other than the district within which the land in 
question was located and failed in that attempt. The parties therefore obtained 
the rights, pursuant to an assignment of a previously approved Application 
for Appropriation, number 32822, from the Plaintiffs1 mother. This was 
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accomplished in August and September of 1973, between the dates of the 
earnest money receipt and the date of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
i The Uniform Real Estate Contract referred to a "well cer-
tificate number ,f and a f 'certificate number " 
in anticipation of perfecting the approved application obtained by the parties. 
Prior to the final payment of the contract, which was on March 13, 1975, 
the Defendants had applied for a change in diversion point for certificate 
number 32822! (February 26, 1974), and had also applied to segregate water 
rights on certificate number 32822 (February 26, 1974), The Plaintiffs 
refused to file similar applications for their interest on certificate num-
ber 32822. Notice for the change of application submitted by the Defendants 
was published as required by law, and a hearing was set for September 17, 
1974, prior to the initiation of the case before the Coiirt. On the date of 
the hearing as scheduled, Plaintiffs1 attorney, Edward Watson, and the 
attorney for Plaintiffs1 cousins, Mr. John Rokich, called and cancelled the 
hearing. The hearing was not immediately reset by the State Engineer's 
Office, and was not rescheduled until February 26, 1976, four (4) months 
after the tr ial of the above-entitled matter. 
By invoking the prohibitions against parole evidence, the Trial 
Court prevented the Defendants from showing that the Defendants had actually 
performed, as much as permitted by Plaintiffs, their agreement to provide the 
one (1) second foot of water. 
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POINT HI 
. IN PERMITTING THE TRIAL COURT TO INVOKE 
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE PAROLE EVIDENCE 
RULE, THE COURT PREVENTED THE DEFENDANTS 
FROM TESTIFYING TO OR SUBMITTING EVIDENCE 
OF THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF DAMAGES, SINCE 
THE TRIAL COURT CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED 
THAT THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION DID NOT HA VE 
ANY WATER RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO THE PROPERTY. 
Throughout the trial the Defendants were prohibited from 
referring to the two-fifths (2/5> interest which the Plaintiffs retained of 
the approved application number 32822 which the parties acquired from 
Plaintiffs' mother. Consequently, the Defendants were prevented from 
showing that the two (2) second feet of water which could have been perfected 
pursuant to the application number 32822 was intended to fulfill the obligation 
whereby the parties were each to provide one (1) second foot of water. Due 
to this prohibition, the Trial Court proceeded on the assumption that no water 
was available on the property purchased by Plaintiffs, and that the Defendants 
had no way of providing the one (1) second foot of water contemplated by the 
parties. In fact, the Plaintiffs are still in a position to now proceed to per-
fect the water rights as to two (2) second feet of water by an application for 
segregation and an application for change in diversion point and by beneficial 
use and appropriation of the water. The irrigation well, which the Defendants 
drilled on the Plaintiffs' property, was drilled in contemplation of these 
applications for segregation and change in diversion point and is fully capable 
of delivering the quantity of water which was contemplated between the parties. 
Consequently, if the Plaintiffs are permitted to prevail as the 
Trial Court decided, the Plaintiffs will have the benefit of a well completed 
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with pump and a two-fifths (2/5) interest in and to an approved application 
representing two (2) second feet of water which could be perfected at any 
time Plaintiffs desire, and a reduction in contract price of Twelve Thousand 
Dollars ($12,000) as ordered by the Trial Court, and the further benefit of 
having land with a fair market value of Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1, 500) per 
acre immediately after the perfection of the two-fifths (2/5) interest in and 
to the approved application number 32822. 
CONCLUSION ,; 
I The Defendants respectfully submit that the Court failed to 
properly review the Trial Court's error in refusing to permit evidence, 
both written and parole, to clarify what the parties had intended regarding 
the two (2) second feet of water which was to be contributed equally between 
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. By doing so, the Court further deprived 
the Defendants of the right to show the proper measure of damages, if any, 
which the Plaintiffs might have suffered, which would be the Defendants1 
failure to deliver one (1) second foot of water at the proposed point of 
diversioh on the land sold by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs. 
The evidence clearly shows that the irrigation well was 
drilled by the Defendants as agreed, that there was water available in the 
well for irrigation purposes, that the Plaintiffs still have a two-fifths (2/5) 
interest in and to an approved application for appropriation of water, that 
the Plaintiffs had used, on a temporary basis, the water available in the 
well, that the Plaintiffs have had sufficient water to irrigate crops with the 
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water from the well, and there is no reason to believe that the two-fifths 
(2/5) interest in and to the approved application number 32822 cannot be 
perfected by Plaintiffs1 application for change in diversion point, for 
segregation of water rights, and by actual beneficial use. 
If the Trial Court's decision is upheld, the Plaintiffs are 
left in a position of having reduced the contract price for the land which 
they purchased from Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) to Five Hundred Dollars 
($500) per acre, of having obtained an irrigation well and the right to perfect 
two (2) second feet of water on the land purchased by the Plaintiffs, all to 
the detriment of the Defendants, and according to Plaintiffs1 own evidence, 
the land purchased by the Plaintiffs would have a fair market value of Fifteen 
Hundred Dollars ($1,500) per acre since the irrigation water is available to 
the Plaintiffs. 
Finally, the Defendants are left in a position of having a 
three-fifths (3/5) interest in and to the approved application number 32822 
which they have thus far been unable to perfect because of the protests filed 
by Plaintiffs' cousins, although the Plaintiffs themselves have not submitted 
a protest. 
The Defendants respectfully submit that the entire case 
should be remanded to the District Court for a new trial which would include 
a cause of action to quiet title to the approved application number 32822 
which was acquired by the Defendants from the Plaintiffs, who acquired 
the same from Plaintiffs' mother. Since the Defendants obtained the rights 
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they may have to the approved application number 32822 from the Plaintiffs, 
the Trial Court should also determine what damages, if any, the Defendants 
suffered from Plaintiffs' failure to deliver clear title to the approved permit. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Phil L. Hansen and Associates 
250 East Third South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
555 East Second South, Suite 215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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